For the past few weeks, anyone who has opened a newspaper, turned on a television, or logged on to a social media account has come across the recent “Bring Back Our Girls” campaign. Continue reading
Several weeks ago, Secretary Chuck Hagel called for reviews of the U.S.’s nuclear forces and in doing so, emphasized the need for a closer examination of the structure and conduct of its personnel. These reviews have been ordered in response to a number of recent scandals associated with nuclear armed forces in recent months, including a cheating scandal on the Air Force’s monthly nuclear proficiency exam, as well as Major Gen. Michael Carey’s dismissal from his supervisory role over intercontinental ballistics missiles after gross misconduct and binge drinking while on an official trip to Moscow. Continue reading
In a recent post on the blog TomDispatch.com, Peter Van Buren published a piece condemning the United States’ drone policy, particularly in regards to the recent news that the U.S. is considering the targeted killing of a U.S. citizen abroad. In the piece, “Drone Killing the Fifth Amendment: How to Build a Post-Constitutional America One Death at a Time,” Van Buren explores the constitutionality of the U.S.’s drone policy, and argues that “They’ve thought about it [targeted killing]. They’ve set up the legal manipulations necessary to justify it.”
It is no great secret that both the legality and the morality of targeted killing has been a hot topic in recent months, Van Buren argues that the practice is at odds with the values our country is based on, as the targeted killing of a U.S. citizen denies him the due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Essentially, Van Buren’s point is that we are in a post-Constitutional America, and have strayed dramatically from the values of our Founding Fathers.
As someone who tends to agree with the loose constructionist interpretation of the Constitution, I side with Van Buren on this. Broadly, I believe that a document written over 200 years ago was never intended to be followed to the letter. Try as they might, our Founding Fathers had no way of predicting what our country would look like and the problems we would face in 2014. What Van Buren is saying, however, is that we have strayed too far from the values our country was built upon. While one would be hard-pressed to find the phrase “targeted killing” or “drone strikes” anywhere within the four corners of the Constitution, we still need to abide by the guiding principles outlined in the document. We are allegedly a country that values freedom, liberty, and due process. If we kill our own citizens in drone strikes, is that truly constitutional?
Kelly Ann Taddonio
Senior Research Fellow
February 18, 2014
Yesterday afternoon, the Associated Press reported that the US is currently tracking an American citizen and terrorist suspect in Pakistan. While officials have not confirmed the identity of the man, they described him as an “al Qaeda facilitator” who is currently plotting attacks against the United States. Now the Obama administration is struggling with the question of whether to use the controversial drone program to eliminate him. Continue reading
Six months after the White House announced that drone strikes would move from the CIA’s authority to the DoD, new reports state that the transfer will not be happening any time in the near future. President Obama originally claimed that the transfer was meant to increase transparency and open up debate in regard to the controversial drone strikes across the Middle East. While many will undoubtedly criticize the delay, the situation may not be as bad as it appears on its face. In fact, it may be that keeping drone strike capabilities in the hands of the CIA will actually be a positive in the long run. Continue reading
Despite claims that drone strikes in Pakistan have been effective and efficient, new reports are set to come out later this week that link the drone campaign with high civilian casualty rates, raising questions regarding the United State’s transparency in the ongoing drone war. Continue reading
About two weeks ago, I promised to outline a new approach to the US’s national security problems in Pakistan as a way to end or reduce the reliance on drone warfare. Here it is, at least in broad outlines: Continue reading
Yesterday afternoon, for the first time since 2009, a Senate committee took to the issue of closing the Guantanamo detention center. The hearing was called by Sen. Richard Durbin (D-Illinois), the Senate’s No. 2 Democrat and chairman of the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on the Constitution, and Civil and Human Rights. In his opening remarks, Sen. Durbin referred to the prison as a sad chapter in American history, a place he had “never imagined in 2013… would still be open.”
“Every day it remains open, Guantanamo prison weakens our alliances, inspires our enemies, and calls into question our commitment to human rights.” – Sen. Durbin
Sen. Durbin has long been critical of Guantanamo Bay. In 2009 he stated that he would be OK with accepting detainees into the Illinois supermax facility. Earlier this month, along with California Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Sen. Durbin asked President Obama to order the Pentagon to stop routinely force-feeding the hunger strikers, challenging the military claim that the enteral feedings were humane and modeled after the federal Bureau of Prisons.
Opposing Sen. Durbin’s request to close the prison, Senator Ted Cruz (R-Texas) harped on the threat of detainee recidivism. Quoting from a recent study by the Director of National Intelligence which found that 28 percent of detainees previously released from Guantanamo were suspected or confirmed to have joined up with terrorist groups upon leaving US custody, Sen. Cruz emphasized the risk we face by releasing the detainees. In agreement, Center for Security Policy president Frank Gaffney stated that moving prisoners from Guantanamo to the U.S. could result in attacks on domestic prisons as well as the spread of radical Islam to other inmates.
As of now, little progress has been made on the closing of Guantanamo. Congress appears to be divided, even among its own factions. I tend to agree with Sen. Durbin and propose that we close Guantanamo. We give the detainee’s their day in court and either send them back to their country of origin if that country is willing to accept them, or we place them in supermax prisons within the United States. Mr. Gaffney’s concerns are ludicrous. We hold hundreds of terrorists in supermax facilities – to my knowledge, there have been no attacks or major issues stemming from the domestic detention of detainees. In fact, a detainee in the general population of a prison will probably have more to fear from us than we will of him. Furthermore, should we allow the detainees to return to their country of origin and something goes wrong – another Abu Ghraib-type escape or a detainee returning to a terrorist cell – just look at what happened to Saeed al-Shiri. While I am not proposing or endorsing the use of drones, I am pointing out that the Obama administration clearly has no problem finding more permanent solutions when it deems necessary. On top of that, the study Sen. Cruz referred to only took into account the number of detainees associated with militant groups, not the number who have actually engaged in violent activities themselves. If I were to guess, the majority of detainees that we saw fit for release were more concerned with starting families and their lives than plotting more attacks.
So what comes next? Most likely nothing. The Pentagon finally announced that they will be establishing Periodic Review Boards – two years after the Obama administration called for their creation (no official dates as of yet). Force feeding and genital searches are still a go. Another day, another story. Maybe next time there is a senate hearing, the Obama administration will actually show up.
Alexandra Kutner, Research Fellow
Center for Policy and Research
Arianna Huffington recently wrote on the Huffington Post about the Obama Administration’s use of so-called “signature strikes” by drones in Pakistan and elsewhere. Underlying much of her criticism is a basic assumption that signature strikes are a new form of targeting that is more pernicious than the more targeted strikes that we are used to. This assumption is perfectly true, if your sense of history goes back no more than about decade.
Signature Strikes are the norm, not the exception
The truth is that what we now call “signature strikes” used to just be called “targeting the enemy.” The practice is in fact so old that it is impossible to trace its origins. In fact, some of the earliest accounts of armed conflict speak about the use of “signatures” or qualities that allow a soldier or government agent to identify an unknown person as a probable member of an enemy group. The Old Testament is replete with examples, including David’s use of foreskins to identify Philistines, and the Gileadites’ use of the word “shibboleth” to identify and kill the Ephraimites.
In fact, knowing the identity of your enemy with any precision was extraordinarily rare until the last ten years. Granted, targeted killing of one sort or another (even leaving aside clear cases of political assassination) has existed for time immemorial as well, but was definitely not the norm. It was instead an unusual undertaking, and attempts rarely led to success. For eons, the standard approach to warfare has been to assemble together a large group of men, few of whom are expected to know any of the enemy by name (with the exception of their king or president), and effectively set them loose on a collection of the enemy population. In later more “civilized” times, these armed groups would mostly only attack one another, although this was never a perfectly uniform practice. These soldiers, whether professionals or conscripts, would not identify an enemy by name, position, or other individualized characteristic. It was always enough that they “look like the enemy.”
This is what has always been expected of soldiers, and to a great extent, still is. We now have more rigorous standards of conduct, laws to mitigate civilian damage done during an attack on enemy forces, and clearly spelled out rules of engagement. Even still, in my four years in US Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, including deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, I was shown a picture of an individual enemy that we planned to kill or capture on a handful of occasions. The rest of the time we were just expected to use the same standard as is used for pornography: you know it when you see it. In other words, we were expected to use the ground combat equivalent of signature strikes. Warfare is just not that individualistic, even today.
Signature strikes may not be new, but our new techniques are helping reduce civilian harm, despite the “evidence”
Still, the US military and intelligence community is becoming impressively proficient at identifying and locating individual members of the enemy. Despite the much publicized (but mostly classified) report recently published by the Center for Naval Analysis’ Larry Lewis, most reliable evidence says that drones, even when used for signature strikes, are much more discriminant and precise, killing or injuring fewer civilians per strike, and far fewer per militant killed. Much of the evidence to the contrary is in fact gained from anonymous sources linked to the Pakistani military or to the militants themselves. Given the sourcing–the enemy and their patrons–it is a little surprising that the claimed number of civilian deaths is in fact so low, even including signature strikes. Maybe these sources are willing to double the number of civilian casualties, but tripling it seems a bridge too far (except for a stalwart few who transparently either fudge their numbers or need to retake middle school pre-algebra).
As a case in point, even the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, who appears at first to be an honest broker of information on drone strikes, upon deeper investigation, are highly biased. They reported yesterday that the number of civilian deaths due to drone strikes in Pakistan has been underreported by 81. They describe this as a “high civilian death toll,” but for a campaign waged over the course of nine years, this is actually an extremely low death toll. I challenge anyone to find another military campaign that lasted nine years yet killed fewer than 45 civilians per year (according to their numbers). However, even these numbers are suspect, as can be seen from their source document, a leaked Pakistani summary of drone strike casualties. Setting aside the arithmetic problems (4+5=8? Apparently, in Pakistan. See line 78), several problems indicate unreliability.
First, the number of civilians killed is not always as clear as the Bureau would have it. In the vast majority of “civilian” casualty cases, the number of civilians are not specified, and is indictated only by inclusion of the word “civilian” in the remarks column. It is not clear whether this means all dead and wounded were civilians or whether one or some of them were. However, in other cases, the number is given, or the remarks indicate that they were “all civilians.”
Second, and more damning, only two references were made to militants out of the nearly 750 dead in 84 attacks. However, one entry refers to “miscreants,” and several others list foreigners as among the dead. This raises the suspicion that the number of militants killed is actually under-reported, and thus the possibility that some listed as civilians are in fact militants.
Third, and worst of all for the reliability of this information, it is apparently obtained secondhand and from afar. Several of the entries indicate that the information is “reported” or “yet to be received.” Local elders and even local political administrations are often pro-Taliban or otherwise compromised (e.g. by bribery which constitutes the majority of their income).
The hard truth is that coming to even a good, ball-parked number of civilian dead is extremely difficult. But what is clear is that the US drone campaign, even when using signature strikes, has a remarkably low rate of civilian casualties when compared to other available options, given their advanced optics, long loiter times, and precision munitions. Those who advocate against drones tend to focus on the technology, when what they are actually opposed to is the use of force in general. This is a laudable sentiment, but these same folks never seem to be willing to offer workable alternatives.
The truth is that drones are here to stay, because they are an extremely useful, discriminating weapon system. Given that we are involved in a protracted conflict with an enemy that hides among the civilian population, our drones and drone pilots are doing a remarkable job. Of course, as I will describe in a later post, relying solely on drones to win this conflict for us is in the end counterproductive. More on that soon.
Paul W. Taylor, Senior Fellow
Center for Policy and Research
Late on Tuesday, July 2, a massive drone strike in northwestern Pakistan killed 16 militants reported by local officials to be associated with the Haqqani network. This was the first drone strike in Pakistan since June 7th, and only the second since the election of Pakistan’s new Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif.
The Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the attack:
“These strikes are a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pakistan has repeatedly emphasized the importance of bringing an immediate end to drone strikes.”
Pakistan’s civilian government has long protested these strikes as a violation of their sovereignty, even while their military coordinates with the US to a clear airspace for the drones. Few in Pakistan vocally support the drone strikes, despite the fact that some officials will quietly admit that they have been an effective means of dealing with their chronic militant problem. Despite this quiet acknowledgement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement asserted that:
“The government of Pakistan has consistently maintained that drone strikes are counterproductive, entail loss of innocent civilian lives and have human rights and humanitarian implications. These drone strikes have a negative impact on the mutual desire of both countries to forge a cordial and cooperative relationship and to ensure peace and stability in the region.”
The last part is definitely true, and will be increasingly true in the future. In fact, at least one analyst believes that the strike will be taken as a personal affront to newly-elected Prime Minister Sharif, since it was conducted while he was out of country on a state visit to China, and may in fact be one of the last drone strikes in Pakistan.
This is not entirely far-fetched, given the rather remarkable decline in drone strikes in Pakistan over the course of the past few years, as I have written about previously, despite initial fears on the left that Obama was going to drastically increase the use of drone strikes. Although, according to data from the New America Foundation, he did initially increase the use of drones to attack militants in Pakistan, quadrupling the number of strikes over his first two years (and incidentally, halving the number of civilian casualties over the same period).
However, there is reason to disbelieve that this declining rate of strikes signals the end of the program. Probably the best indicator is that the drop in the number of drone strikes does not appear to be correlated to any decrease in the number of leaders these strikes have taken out of the fight. This may just indicate that the strikes are more selective, and that we are getting better at locating and targeting the leadership.
Interestingly, it is not necessarily our own enemies that we have been targeting. It is relatively well-known that the first drone strike in Pakistan, which killed Taliban leader Nek Mohammad, was selected at the specific request of the Pakistani military, in order to rid them of an enemy of the Pakistani state. And while the Afghan Taliban have received aid and shelter from Pakistan, their sister organization, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has targeted Pakistani government forces and installations with brutal efficiency. They have even captured territory startling close to Pakistan’s capitol, Islamabad. Pakistan seems unable or unwilling to crush this movement. The US has been working on it for them, however. Of the five Taliban leaders killed in US drone strikes in 2013, four have been leaders of TTP. Simultaneously, the number of Afghan Taliban leaders killed in drone strikes has been on the decline.
With all of the back-room dealing that has occurred between various parts of the Pakistani and US governments, is entirely possible that a deal has been struck with the Pakistani military that will allow the US to continue to use drones to target its own enemy, so long as it also takes out Pakistan’s, as well.
There is also reason to believe that the US will continue to use drones in Pakistan with or without its consent. The continuing instability in rural Pakistan and the inability of the Pakistani government to reduce the violence emanating from the region, which is much more substantial than that caused by drones, as well as its inability or unwillingness to limit the export of terrorism and insurgency from its territory cannot simply be ignored. It is not a bumblebee that will go away if left to its own devices. And until some alternate method of limiting the Taliban’s and Al Qaeda’s ability to use Pakistan’s territory to train and equip their operatives and send them out against America and its allies, the US government will have little choice but to employ drones, even if in a more limited and selective fashion.
Paul W. Taylor, Senior Fellow
Center for Policy & Research