Snowden circumvented legitimate whistleblower route

Over the last couple of weeks, the a lot has been said on both sides of the argument about Edward Snowden, the NSA leaker, and the balance of national security and privacy. His disclosures have raised a moderate amount of outrage on the part of libertarians of both parties, as well as a great deal of discussion on the proper balance of national security needs and privacy rights.

Interestingly, most representatives in Congress does not seem that perturbed by the idea of these programs, although they are livid that they were disclosed in this manner. And of course the Executive has been outraged that one of its trusted contractors has turned on them. And now, Snowden has been charged with espionage, however poorly that statute may fit the offense.

Something that is lost in all of this debate on whether the surveillance programs in question are legal, ethical, wise, etc. is the question of who should be asking these questions and how. We have a Whistleblower Protection Act for a reason, after all. It reiterates and reinforces the idea that national security policy questions are to be dealt with by our cadre of national security professionals and by Congress.

Snowden claims that he leaked the information in order to allow the American public to decide for itself if these programs were appropriate. But his own actions and methods belie this intent. By releasing the information into the public domain, instead of following the prescribed chain of notification and complaint, Snowden decided himself that the programs were a violation of the public’s privacy rights. So instead of having the decision on the careful balance between national security nd privacy made by our elected representatives, Snowden ensured that it was made by an unaccountable high school dropout.

I do not bring up this last point out of spite, or to merely disparage Snowden; I, too, never completed high school.  However, there is a reason for the overwhelming preference for college graduates with a broad liberal arts background. Such an education promotes better contextual understanding of the fine balances between the different competing factors confronted in any given situation. This is precisely the skill that the central question in this affair requires: whether the value to national security of these programs is worth the loss of a given amount of privacy. Interestingly enough, this is also exactly the type of decision made on a daily basis by our elected representatives in Congress, who (not incidentally) should have been the Snowden’s last stop before going public.

I know understand how powerful the personal belief that a certain national security program or event is unethical and must be exposed can be. I have been personally involved in a whistleblower case, and seen with my own eyes the emotional strain that can be caused by holding back the information that you vehemently believe should be made public. But that does not excuse those like Snowden or Bradley Manning, who have simply bypassed all of the proper channels and taken the decision entirely into their own hands.

If Snowden was a true patriot, he would not broadcast his information from safe havens abroad, on the run from the law (although he claims he is “not here to hide”—again, his actions belie his claimed intent). He would instead do what respectable whistleblowers do: First go through the correct channels, and when that fails and resort to the open media is required, stand up and face the music. Such whistleblowers often go unprosecuted, and when they are, they can at least rely on a jury of their fellow citizens to come to the rescue.

Paul W. Taylor, Senior Fellow
Center for Policy & Research

Former DOD Lawyer Frowns on Drone Court

Last week Jeh Johnson, the general council for the Department of Defense during President Obama’s first term, warned at a conference at Fordham Law School that the President’s targeted killing policies breeds mistrust among the public:

“The problem is that the American public is suspicious of executive power shrouded in secrecy. In the absence of an official picture of what our government is doing, and by what authority, many in the public fill the void by imagining the worst.”

However, he was skeptical about recent calls for a “drone court” to review and approve or deny targeted killing decisions:

“To be sure, a national security court composed of a bipartisan group of federal judges with life tenure, to approve targeted lethal force, would bring some added levels of credibility, independence and rigor to the process, and those are worthy goals.”

“But, we must be realistic about the degree of added credibility such a court can provide. Its proceedings would necessarily be ex parte and in secret, and, like a FISA court, I suspect almost all of the government”s applications would be granted, because, like a FISA application, the government would be sure to present a compelling case. … [While] the New York Times editorial page promotes a FISA-like court for targeted lethal force, it derides the FISA court as a ‘rubber stamp’ because it almost never rejects an application. How long before a ‘drone court’ operating in secret is criticized in the same way?”

Apparently not long, since I have already raised this criticism in a previous post. However, I coupled this criticism with a proposed solution: using ex post review, rather than ex ante. By removing from the judge’s consideration the concern for the pressing national security need involved in deciding whether a proposed target is an imminent threat, ex post review would allow the judge to be more critical of the Administration’s case, and make the court less likely to become another “rubber stamp.”

Mr. Johnson raised other several issues with the concept of a national security court for targeted killing decisions, as well. Interestingly, all of these concerns would be eliminated or greatly mitigated by removing the assumption that the court would authorize the killings, rather than ratify them afterward.

First, Johnson notes, as others have, that judges would be loath to issue the equivalent of death warrants, first of all on purely moral grounds, but also on more political grounds. Courts enjoy the highest approval ratings of the three branches of government, yet accepting the responsibility to determine which individuals may live or die, without that individual having an opportunity to appear before the court would simply shift some of the public opprobrium from the Executive to the Judiciary. However, if the court exercised ex post review, it instead would be in its ordinary position of approving or disapproving the Executive’s decisions, not making its decisions for it.

Another concern raised by Johnson is that the judges would be highly uncomfortable making such decisions because they would be necessarily involve a secret, purely ex parte process. While courts do this on a daily basis, as when they issue search or arrest warrants, the targeted killing context stands apart in that the judge’s decision would be effectively irreversible. Here again, the use of ex post process would free the courts from this problem, and place it in the executive (which includes the military, incidentally, an organization which deals with this issue as a matter of course).

Johnson also notes that even the determination of the facts is fraught with problems. The first three of Holder’s criteria for the legality of a targeted killing operation, feasibility of capture, imminence of threat, and senior leadership in an enemy organization, are time-sensitive determinations. Feasibility, Johnson notes from personal experience, can change several times in one night. That imminence may change over time is obvious to anyone with a dictionary. And while a target’s position as a senior leader in al-Qaeda is unlikely to change very often, it does on occasion (take the case of Mokhtar Belmokhtar). Requiring a court to determine these facts in advance would also require that the executive would have to notify the court when any change has occurred that might effect that determination. Meanwhile, use of ex post review would allow the court to look at a single point in time, when the executive “pulled the trigger” on the operation, thus crystallizing the facts and obviating this problem.

The last of the Holder criteria, too, causes problems. This criterion requires that the operation be executed in compliance with the law of war. Of course, this is capable of determination only after the fact. Thus, no ex ante review will be able to determine if this requirement is satisfied. An ex post review, however, could.

Johnson also raised a very significant separation of powers concern. While the President’s duties and powers are not well enumerated in the Constitution, one thing is made clear: the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. According to Johnson, the President therefore cannot abdicate his responsibilities as Commander in Chief to another branch of the government, nor can Congress remove those powers to itself or the Judiciary. While this is not an entirely settled question of law (note the War Powers Act and Congress’ power of the purse strings), it can be easily avoided by conducting the review ex post. After all, ex post review of the execution of nearly any of the President’s powers is fully within the authorities of the Judicial Branch.

Johnson also notes that any requirement for ex ante review of a national security issue will require an exception for exigent circumstances. Johnson asks, “is it therefore worth it?” Without coming to a conclusion on this question, ex post review would obviate the concern. No exigent circumstances can occur after the the deed is done.

Lastly, there is the concern of creating perverse incentives: whether a person’s name or identity is known has never been a factor in determining the legality of targeting an otherwise-lawful military target. But by creating a separate legal regime for known targets, we could create a disincentive to collect information about a target. We do not want a military or intelligence agency that keeps itself intentionally uninformed. Nor do we want to halt a military operation in progress simply because one of the targets is recognized late. Conducting the review ex post would not eliminate these issues, but it would substantially mitigate them. The military (or CIA, if it keeps its program), would not fear an interruption of its operations, and could even have an incentive to collect more information in order to later please a court that has plenty of time to look back at the past operations and question whether an individual was in fact targeted.

Not mentioned in Mr. Johnson’s comments, but related to his concern regarding perverse incentives, is another concern. The Executive, or some agency within it, may attempt to evade the jurisdiction of the court by claiming that it did not “specifically target” the individual, but was targeting under general constitutional authorities “someone” that appeared to be an imminent threat to the US–and now the case is moot. No court could enforce its jurisdiction before it knows that the individual is targeted, but it can enforce its jurisdiction after the targeting is brought to completion. In an ex post review, if the claim is made that the killing was not “targeted,” and thus that no review is necessary, the court will be able to employ its power to determine its own jurisdiction to enquire into the process leading to the killing, which in this type of review would be half the job.

Thus, for each of Mr. Johnson’s concerns about the wisdom or legality  of a “national security court” to review targeted killing decisions, it is the reliance on ex ante review that causes all or most of the problem. However, ex-post review will give the public the assurance that it seeks that the Executive is not abusing and will not abuse its vast military might, while still providing it the room to carry out its responsibilities. Unfortunately, it is not something that many people seem to devote much attention to.

(The full text of Mr. Johnson’s address is here.)

Paul Taylor, Senior Research Fellow
Center for Policy & Research

A New Look at Targeted Killing Authorities

The Obama administration is reportedly taking another look at the legal foundations of its use of drones for lethal counterterrorism operations. And none too soon, with the changes in the structure of al-Qaeda stretching the AUMF to the breaking point.

Like the war in Afghanistan, the targeted killing campaign in Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere was undertaken under legal auspices of the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, passed by Congress in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. That law allowed the administration “to use all necessary and appropriate force” against those who “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” the 9/11 attacks or who “harbored such organizations or persons”.

However, with the continuing tactical successes of the dogged and technologically sophisticated campaign to target the core al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan over the last several years, the terrorist network has become much more diffuse.  This makes finding the necessary connections to the al- Qaeda senior leadership much more difficult, thereby undermining the legal justification for using lethal force. In fact, even detaining these individuals would require that they fall under the AUMF or some other legal authority (something critics of targeted killing often overlook).

This diffusion of al-Qaeda—and the legal authorities for use of force—is not a particularly new phenomenon. After all, after the invasion of Afghanistan, and the routing of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, many al-Qaeda operatives left the Afghanistan/Pakistan theater altogether, dispersing across the globe. They were not going into hiding, per se, but looking for new places to recruit, plan, and carry out their terrorist operations. When the US subsequently invaded Iraq, some al-Qaeda operatives followed us there to take root in the security void we created.

The courts have taken an expansive view of the AUMF, allowing the administration to target these “associated forces,” or what many analysts have called al-Qaeda 2.0. However, these individuals and groups had clear, direct connections to the original, core al-Qaeda element run by Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri which planned and carried out the 9/11 attacks.

Most al-Qaeda 2.0 groups were founded and run by his lieutenants, and remained in contact with Bin Laden. This is not true of the newest crop of terrorist groups cropping up across the Middle East and Africa. Instead, the leadership of these new groups often learned their trade as lieutenants to al-Qaeda 2.0 leaders and have only the most tenuous connections to the core al-Qaeda group. This makes fitting them into the AUMF scheme difficult, creating questionable legal authority to use lethal force.

According to a senior Obama administration official,

“The farther we get away from 9/11 and what this legislation was initially focused upon, we can see from both a theoretical but also a practical standpoint that groups that have arisen or morphed become more difficult to fit in.”

Even the leaders with the firmest connections often pose legal problems: Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former fighter in Afghanistan and later leader of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), had broken ties with AQIM and formed his own group, the al-Mulathameen Brigade operating in Algeria and Mali. The threat he poses to the to the US is not diminished, however. He was the mastermind of the Algerian gas plant attack, which lead to the deaths of three US citizens. However, because he is no longer a part of al-Qaeda or one of its franchises, the administration determined that the AUMF would apply to him.

When those like Belmokhtar and the Benghazi attackers kill Americans, the US could capture them based on criminal law enforcement authorities. However, should we have to wait for US citizens to be victimized before we allow the government to take action, when we know that an individual or group has nefarious intentions? Should we also have to wait until they show up somewhere that we can execute an arrest without undue danger to our agents?

The Obama administration is now looking for ways to square this circle, and create a more permanent framework for dealing with these issues. However, they apparently do not like their options. Simply expanding the current AUMF is unappealing. “You can’t end the war if you keep adding people to the enemy who are not actually part of the original enemy,” according to one person who participated in the administration’s internal debates. But relying solely on the constitutional authority of the President are not appealing either.

And while the administration may be correct that there is little political appetite for it, what is needed is a new authorization, allowing the executive broader authorities to kill or capture terrorists that target US interests, not just those connected to specific prior attacks. But these authorities must be coupled with judicial and congressional oversight procedures to protect against abuse or overuse. In fact, failure to create these authorities with built-in checks will encourage future presidents to rely on their inherent authority to act to defend the country from foreign threats, thus seizing all of the power with none of the constraints.

A more comprehensive “Counterterrorism Operations Powers Act” would create checks on the President’s powers, while still giving him the ability to carry out his duty to protect the nation. It would also help to elucidate the line between law enforcement situations and national security/counterterrorism situations.

Paul Taylor, Senior Research Fellow
Center for Policy & Research

A FISC for Drones?

With the confirmation hearings of John Brennan as Director of Central Intelligence, news related to the U.S. drone program is coming fast. This time it was made by Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA), chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Both during the hearing and in comments to the press afterward, Sen. Feinstein suggested that she and other Democrats would be working to create a new court that would review the administration’s decisions on who may be targeted in lethal counter-terrorism operations. (I assume at that such a court would be given jurisdiction over all targeted killings, not just those conducted by drones, despite the common conflation of the two.)

The concept of a court or tribunal of some sort to review or provide oversight for targeted killing decisions, whether restricted to those targeting U.S. citizens or with a broader mandate, is not new (see, e.g., our previous post). However, this is the highest profile such suggestion that has yet been made.

In Sen. Feinstein’s conception, the court would be modeled after the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), with the aim of increasing transparency and to correct public misconceptions about civilian casualties.

Such a court could also help to alleviate concerns that the administration is overly-permissive in its decisions to use targeted killing instead of other alternatives. For example, the editorial board of the New York Times writes, “Mr. Brennan’s assertions that the government only resorts to lethal force when ‘there is no other alternative’ is at odds with reports of vastly increased drone strikes.” An independent body which reviews such determinations would go a long way in ensuring that such concerns are addressed.

As an interesting aside, it seems that not everyone is concerned that President Obama is sliding into a Bush Doctrine approach. John Yoo wrote in the Wall Street Journal that “[t]he real story revealed by the [white paper released Monday] is that the Obama administration is trying to dilute the normal practice of war with law-enforcement methods.” However, this appears to be a minority view.

Ex Ante or Ex Post?

If the FISC forms the model for this targeted killing court, then the assumption would be that it would that the court would review the targeting decisions ex ante. That is, before the administration could act, it would have to produce for the court the evidence or intelligence gathered to support the targeting decision. The court would then review the evidence for some level of sufficiency before allowing the operation to move forward.

However, many of the suggestions for a tribunal to review these killings call instead for ex post review. This is the model required in Israel. The basic idea of this is generally that waiting until the operation is complete keeps the court out of the way of military or para-military operations, but still maintains some oversight.

Robert Chesney of Lawfare provided some very interesting points to consider about such a court, including whether the review should be ex ante or ex post. He falls on the side of ex ante, but some of his commentary actually seems to point in the other direction. First, he points out the all of the serious propositions would subject the nomination process to judicial review, not the “trigger pull.”  This temporally removes the judicial authorization from the final decision to kill, and in Chesney’s view eliminates the concern that the process will interfere with the execution of the operation.

I’m not sure that it does. Names may be placed on the list at any time, conceivably as the result of a time sensitive push within the intelligence community. While I am not an expert in the process of targeting decisions, I think that the executive may need to be able to act quickly on new information that indicates that a subject is targetable. Ex ante review would place an additional hurdle between the decisive intelligence and the operation. Chesney seems to realize this by admitting the need for an “exigent circumstances exemption.” But this exception would itself mean defaulting back to an ex post review.

Additionally, Chesney notes that “Some judges want absolutely nothing to do with this … due to hostility to the idea of judicial involvement in death warrants.  (And that’s without considering the possibility of warrant-issuing judges finding themselves the object of suit or prosecution abroad.)”

Judges would likely be much more comfortable with ex post review. Ex post review would free them from any implication that they are issuing a “death warrant” and would place them in a position that they are much more comfortable with: reviewing executive uses of force after the fact. While there are clearly parallels that could be drawn between the ex ante review proposed here and the search and seizure warrants that judges routinely deal with, there are also important differences. First and foremost is that this implicates not the executive’s law enforcement responsibility but its war-making and foreign relations responsibilities, with which courts are loath to interfere, but are sometimes willing to review for abuse.

Additionally, in search and seizure warranting, there an ex post review will eventually be available. That will likely not be the case in drone strikes and other targeted killings unless such a process is specifically created. There are simply too many hurdles to judicial review (including state secrets, political questions, discovery problems, etc) for the courts to create such an opportunity without congressional action.

Chesney also noted that executive officials involved in the nomination process would prefer an ex ante review to shield them from unexpected civil liability by the victims or their families. I’m sure that it is true that administration officials would like to have “certainty ex ante that they would not face a lawsuit.” However, this is not a guarantee that the courts can provide to the executive. As noted above, as with search and seizure  warrants, there are issues to consider after the approval of the executive action. Ex ante review does not allow for inquiry into important ancillary issues, such as the balancing of risk to civilian bystanders. Also, it provides no assurances that new, exculpatory intelligence forces a reassessment of the targeting decision. Only ex post review would achieve this.

There is also the problem that typified the FISC: permissiveness. Of the tens of thousands of FISA warrant requests, only a handful have been rejected. When allowing for modification of the requests, it is not clear whether any have been finally rejected. There is little reason to believe that the proposed “drone court” will be much different. It is far too likely that a court will hesitate to impede an operation that the executive believes is required to protect out national security. Once the operation is complete, however, the court will not be inclined to hold back its criticism on all manner of aspects of the operation, from the initial targeting decision to the final execution.

Lastly, as Chesney himself points out:

Of course, there is also the question whether creating any such system is constitutional in the first place, especially if the system is framed to encompass more than just US persons…

This may true for ex ante review, but one of the courts’ fundamental mandates reviewing the executive’s activities for abuse of its power. This is even true in cases involving military or foreign affairs, where the executive is given the widest latitude and enjoys the greatest autonomy.

I do share Chesney’s suspicion that a tort-based process in which victims seek damages is not the appropriate means of reviewing targeted killing decisions. However, I am certain that regardless of whether an ex ante review is used, some ex post review must be available. There are simply too many variables between the initial nomination and the final execution of the mission that should be subject to some independent review. Indeed, as a veteran, I know the value of lessons learned in after action reviews, but I also know how often these reviews are shortchanged or skipped altogether. An ex post judicial review will ensure that this does not happen here.

Paul Taylor, Senior Research Fellow

Center for Policy & Research

When Will Obama Close GTMO?

Since President Obama’s inauguration last month, his unfulfilled promise to close Guantanamo Bay Detention Center has once again risen to the forefront of the public discourse.  Throughout his campaign as a presidential candidate, and into his first term as President of the United States, Obama stated multiple times that he was going to ensure Guantanamo closed its doors.  In fact, on January 22, 2009, he began his second term in office by signing an Executive Order directing that, “the detention facilities at Guantánamo for individuals covered by this order shall be closed as soon as practicable, and no later than 1 year from the date of this order.”

Why, then, in 2013, four years after this Executive Order, is Guantanamo still open?

During the Executive Order’s signing ceremony, Obama made it clear that closing Guantanamo would be accomplished in a manner that prioritized United States national security and foreign policy interests.  This may be true, but as we have seen throughout Obama’s first term as President, closing Guantanamo is far easier said than done.

A lot of the pushback against closing GTMO comes from our representatives.  Congress has used its spending oversight authority both to forbid the White House from financing trials of Guantánamo captives on U.S. soil and to block the acquisition of a state prison in Illinois to hold captives currently held in Cuba who would not be put on trial — a sort of Guantánamo North.[1]  Despite these road blocks, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., the Senate Intelligence Committee chairwoman, has indicated recently that “if the political will exists, we could finally close Guantanamo without imperiling our national security.”[2]

If President Obama wants to close GTMO, he needs to take some serious action soon, and establish a concrete plan that will garner support from the public, but more importantly, the politicians voting for his plan.  Today, most Republicans and some Democrats remain opposed to closing the facility.  House Armed Services Chairman Buck McKeon has said, “no one has ever argued that Guantanamo Bay is ideal, but before you talk about closing it you have to tell the country what you will replace it with.”

While politicians cite a variety of reasons for opposing closing down GTMO, it frequently comes down to cost and safety.  A quick look at operating costs reveals it is far cheaper to house the remaining GTMO detainees in the United States vs. at the facility.

As of today, the 166 detainees held at Guantanamo costs the United States an astounding $114 million each year to operate.  Transferring these detainees to a facility in the United States would be far cheaper.  According to John Maki, who heads the John Howard Association (a watchdog group that monitors Illinois prisons), it cost $26 million annually to run the Tamms Supermax in Illinois- a recently closed prison with fewer than 200 inmates which was frequently referred to as being “tougher than GTMO.”  That’s 22.8% of the cost of operating GTMO.

As to the safety argument, Senator John Thune, Republican of South Dakota, has stated that “the American people don’t want these men walking the streets of America’s neighborhoods.” Ignorant comments like this are tainting public opinion. As dangerous as some of these men may be, they will in no way be “walking the streets of America’s neighborhoods.” They would be locked up in a highly secure prison- no more dangerous than the murderers, rapists, and other criminals they would be sharing their facility with.

Thus, it is clear that the real hurdle to closing GTMO is the fear mongering of our Congress.  America is ready for GTMO to close, we just need our elected representatives to get on board with us.

Paul Juzdan, Research Fellow

Center for Policy and Research


[1] http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136781/carol-rosenberg/why-obama-cant-close-guantanamo

[2] http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=617e2735-349d-447c-8fc6-78d2a3a00bc5

DOJ Targeted Killing White Paper

On Monday, NBC obtained an unsigned Justice Department white paper outlining the Obama administration’s legal position on circumstances under which the United States could lawfully kill a U.S. citizen in a counter-terror operation.  Unfortunately, the 16-page document is not the full OLC memo that has been requested by several members of Congress, but an abbreviated version of it that was provided last summer to members of the Senate Intelligence and Judiciary committees.

The white paper expressly limits its scope to those citizens who are a senior al-Qaeda member or an “associated force” in a foreign country, outside an area of active hostilities. In brief, it asserts it would be legal to use lethal force against a U.S. citizen in such cases if three conditions are met:

1) an informed, high-level government official has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat to the U.S.;

2) capture is infeasible; and

3) the operation complied with applicable laws of war.

The while this white paper is as yet the most detailed public account of the Obama administration’s legal justification for the targeted killing of Americans, it is unfortunately short on details of the decision-making process. As pointed out by Steve Vladeck at Lawfare, most Americans understand that there may be occasions in which U.S. citizens who engage in terrorist activities must be targeted in the same way that foreign terrorists are. What matters is the process for coming to that decision. We have due process protections because we are concerned no only about government overreach, but also to adequately protect us from erroneous determinations and unnecessary reliance on force. This helps ensure that, for example, they really are an active member of al Qaeda, that they cannot they be arrested, and that we cannot simply wait until capture is feasible.

The criteria listed above clearly attempt to ensure that these issues are addressed, but this is not nearly enough. A constitutional lawyer like President Obama should not need reminding that unchecked executive power is very dangerous to liberty. And there is nothing in this white paper to suggest that any outside check or review has been placed on the Executive’s ability to conduct these lethal operations against its own citizens.

In fact, it suggests that judicial review is inappropriate. Its reasoning for this is that it would require ex ante review of targeting decisions, which are inherently predictive and not amenable to judicial determination. This would be quite astute, were it true. However, most critics who have called for judicial involvement in targeted killing decisions, myself included, have clearly stipulated that the courts review the governments actions ex post, and at least partly ex parte.

Additionally, as Steve points out, the white paper’s suggestion that targeted killing decisions are non-justiciable political questions is absurd. These determinations are in many ways no different than those made in law enforcement situations, as when a sniper shoots a hostage-taker. Such cases are often reviewed (ex post) by the courts. Even in those ways in which they are different, the courts have already been involved, as with the spate of recent habeas litigation.

It is because of these issues that the white paper does nothing to satisfy the concerns over executive power. Many have claimed that this document displays the Obama administration’s backslid into something resembling the “Bush Doctrine.” But rather than the nitpicking over the legal conclusions of the white paper as many analysts have (Mary Ellen O’Connell is still ranting about “zones” of conflict—see my analysis), it is this refusal to allow any review of the decision-making process that raises the most severe concerns over President Obama’s targeted killing program.

Paul Taylor, Senior Research Fellow

Center for Policy & Research