Despite the public’s hopes that the NSA’s telephone surveillance program would be deemed unconstitutional, the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) recently gave the Agency the go-ahead to continue collecting and analyzing millions of Americans’ private phone records. However, the extension may only be temporary as the FISC only granted the NSA three more months of surveillance. Continue reading
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court was created by Congress in
1978 to review applications for warrants related to national security
investigations. According to the Federal Judicial Center website, initially the court
was created in part as a response to allegations that the executive
branch was abusing its authority in conducting domestic electronic
surveillance in the interest of national security. (Sounds familiar,
doesn’t it?) Presumably the goals of the court have been to preserve
an air of fairness in relation to what are otherwise sensitive issues of
national security dominated by the executive branch.
But, it’s fairly disconcerting to have a court creating a body of law
that is essentially kept a secret from the public. So in February,
Senator Diane Feinstein sent a letter to presiding judge of FISA,
requesting that “important rulings of law” be declassified by FISA
to inform the public about FISA.
In 2010, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the
Department of Justice established a process to declassify opinions that
are “assessed to contain a significant interpretation of law,” but the
policy never really took hold. The court’s presiding judge Reggie
Walton, wrote in response to Feinstein’s letter that, “While
classification determinations are made by the Executive Branch in the
first instance, the facts presented in applications to [FISA] always
or almost always involve classified intelligence activities, the
disclosure of which could be harmful to the nation’s security.”
So it seems that while FISA was originally formed as a response to
the Executive branch’s abuse of authority, it really just serves as a
mechanism by which that same branch can maintain an authoritative
stranglehold on national security practices through the language of
“classification.” As a result, the power of FISA is as great as the
executive branch’s power to classify, which is always growing.
Perhaps there are highly sensitive issues that FISA is protecting,
but a judicial policy to protect information “classified” by the
government is especially problematic when the government is known to
over-classify. The real question is, are the the “classified intelligence activities” that
Reggie Walton claims FISA’s secrecy protects truly of a sensitive
and detrimental nature to our nation’s security, or just more instances of the
government classifying information to protect itself from public scrutiny?
Alison Frimmel, Research Fellow
Center for Policy and Research
Just as many predicted from the beginning, it looks like the NSA surveillance scandal has reached beyond the NSA to other branches of government. On Saturday the New York Times reported that over the past few years, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, or FISA, has basically created an entire new category of law pertaining to surveillance for the NSA and CIA. FISA has reportedly handed down over a dozen classified rulings on everything from espionage to nuclear proliferation to cyber attacks. It appears that FISA has quietly taken over the Supreme Court’s role in all matters pertaining to surveillance.
Most notably, the court used a particular case to expand a little-known doctrine called the “special needs” doctrine that allows authorities to sidestep the Fourth Amendment by performing search and seizure operations without the need for a warrant. The government claims that this expansion of the special needs doctrine is only applicable in terrorism-related cases. The exception is typically used only for things like airport screenings and DUI checkpoints. Professor William C. Banks of Syracuse University stated that the use of this doctrine is just “another way of tipping the scales toward the government in its access to all this data.”
So how can FISA justify the expansion of this doctrine, essentially abandoning the use of the Fourth Amendment’s protection from arbitrary searches and seizures? It looks like it came down to the interpretation of one word: Relevant. Instead of interpreting the word in the narrow sense used in most criminal cases, the court elected to broaden its scope, allowing the NSA to collect any records that could possibly be relevant to national security concerns. This interpretation has drawn sharp criticism in the past few days. A senior partner at Perkins Cole LLP, the Justice Department’s go-to firm on federal surveillance law, claims that FISA has destroyed the meaning of “relevant” altogether, essentially changing it to mean “everything.” He also mentioned that a typical federal or state court would laugh the prosecution out of the courtroom if it tried to argue for this new interpretation.
But what does this mean for the average American? Probably not much. As I’ve said before, I don’t think the NSA has the time or resources to rifle though billions of pages of records that they know are not “relevant” to national security. I have a hard time believing that our government is reading all our “LOL’s” and “IDK’s” when there is so much at stake. In fact, it’s come out that even though the NSA has the power to collect the records, they still needed a warrant to actually access them. Sure, the government still has plenty of egg on its face and has sufficiently embarrassed itself on a global scale. But now, roughly a month after Edward Snowden first released information on this scandal, we still have yet to hear of any connection between the NSA’s programs and any non-terrorism-related arrests.
With that said, it’s hard not to be concerned when courts hand down secret rulings that essentially throw away our Constitutional protections. At least for now the traditional law requiring warrants for searches and seizures still applies to normal cases, but that won’t make to many people feel better about the fact that we have a highly secretive court handing down classified decisions that have the potential wipe out our most basic freedoms. I’m usually willing to give the government a pass when it comes to protecting our national security, but this has to stop somewhere. I think it’s safe to say that the American government has officially pole-vaulted over that fine line between protecting our freedom and trampling on it.
Chris Whitten, Research Fellow
Center for Policy and Research
Last week Jeh Johnson, the general council for the Department of Defense during President Obama’s first term, warned at a conference at Fordham Law School that the President’s targeted killing policies breeds mistrust among the public:
“The problem is that the American public is suspicious of executive power shrouded in secrecy. In the absence of an official picture of what our government is doing, and by what authority, many in the public fill the void by imagining the worst.”
However, he was skeptical about recent calls for a “drone court” to review and approve or deny targeted killing decisions:
“To be sure, a national security court composed of a bipartisan group of federal judges with life tenure, to approve targeted lethal force, would bring some added levels of credibility, independence and rigor to the process, and those are worthy goals.”
“But, we must be realistic about the degree of added credibility such a court can provide. Its proceedings would necessarily be ex parte and in secret, and, like a FISA court, I suspect almost all of the government”s applications would be granted, because, like a FISA application, the government would be sure to present a compelling case. … [While] the New York Times editorial page promotes a FISA-like court for targeted lethal force, it derides the FISA court as a ‘rubber stamp’ because it almost never rejects an application. How long before a ‘drone court’ operating in secret is criticized in the same way?”
Apparently not long, since I have already raised this criticism in a previous post. However, I coupled this criticism with a proposed solution: using ex post review, rather than ex ante. By removing from the judge’s consideration the concern for the pressing national security need involved in deciding whether a proposed target is an imminent threat, ex post review would allow the judge to be more critical of the Administration’s case, and make the court less likely to become another “rubber stamp.”
Mr. Johnson raised other several issues with the concept of a national security court for targeted killing decisions, as well. Interestingly, all of these concerns would be eliminated or greatly mitigated by removing the assumption that the court would authorize the killings, rather than ratify them afterward.
First, Johnson notes, as others have, that judges would be loath to issue the equivalent of death warrants, first of all on purely moral grounds, but also on more political grounds. Courts enjoy the highest approval ratings of the three branches of government, yet accepting the responsibility to determine which individuals may live or die, without that individual having an opportunity to appear before the court would simply shift some of the public opprobrium from the Executive to the Judiciary. However, if the court exercised ex post review, it instead would be in its ordinary position of approving or disapproving the Executive’s decisions, not making its decisions for it.
Another concern raised by Johnson is that the judges would be highly uncomfortable making such decisions because they would be necessarily involve a secret, purely ex parte process. While courts do this on a daily basis, as when they issue search or arrest warrants, the targeted killing context stands apart in that the judge’s decision would be effectively irreversible. Here again, the use of ex post process would free the courts from this problem, and place it in the executive (which includes the military, incidentally, an organization which deals with this issue as a matter of course).
Johnson also notes that even the determination of the facts is fraught with problems. The first three of Holder’s criteria for the legality of a targeted killing operation, feasibility of capture, imminence of threat, and senior leadership in an enemy organization, are time-sensitive determinations. Feasibility, Johnson notes from personal experience, can change several times in one night. That imminence may change over time is obvious to anyone with a dictionary. And while a target’s position as a senior leader in al-Qaeda is unlikely to change very often, it does on occasion (take the case of Mokhtar Belmokhtar). Requiring a court to determine these facts in advance would also require that the executive would have to notify the court when any change has occurred that might effect that determination. Meanwhile, use of ex post review would allow the court to look at a single point in time, when the executive “pulled the trigger” on the operation, thus crystallizing the facts and obviating this problem.
The last of the Holder criteria, too, causes problems. This criterion requires that the operation be executed in compliance with the law of war. Of course, this is capable of determination only after the fact. Thus, no ex ante review will be able to determine if this requirement is satisfied. An ex post review, however, could.
Johnson also raised a very significant separation of powers concern. While the President’s duties and powers are not well enumerated in the Constitution, one thing is made clear: the President is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. According to Johnson, the President therefore cannot abdicate his responsibilities as Commander in Chief to another branch of the government, nor can Congress remove those powers to itself or the Judiciary. While this is not an entirely settled question of law (note the War Powers Act and Congress’ power of the purse strings), it can be easily avoided by conducting the review ex post. After all, ex post review of the execution of nearly any of the President’s powers is fully within the authorities of the Judicial Branch.
Johnson also notes that any requirement for ex ante review of a national security issue will require an exception for exigent circumstances. Johnson asks, “is it therefore worth it?” Without coming to a conclusion on this question, ex post review would obviate the concern. No exigent circumstances can occur after the the deed is done.
Lastly, there is the concern of creating perverse incentives: whether a person’s name or identity is known has never been a factor in determining the legality of targeting an otherwise-lawful military target. But by creating a separate legal regime for known targets, we could create a disincentive to collect information about a target. We do not want a military or intelligence agency that keeps itself intentionally uninformed. Nor do we want to halt a military operation in progress simply because one of the targets is recognized late. Conducting the review ex post would not eliminate these issues, but it would substantially mitigate them. The military (or CIA, if it keeps its program), would not fear an interruption of its operations, and could even have an incentive to collect more information in order to later please a court that has plenty of time to look back at the past operations and question whether an individual was in fact targeted.
Not mentioned in Mr. Johnson’s comments, but related to his concern regarding perverse incentives, is another concern. The Executive, or some agency within it, may attempt to evade the jurisdiction of the court by claiming that it did not “specifically target” the individual, but was targeting under general constitutional authorities “someone” that appeared to be an imminent threat to the US–and now the case is moot. No court could enforce its jurisdiction before it knows that the individual is targeted, but it can enforce its jurisdiction after the targeting is brought to completion. In an ex post review, if the claim is made that the killing was not “targeted,” and thus that no review is necessary, the court will be able to employ its power to determine its own jurisdiction to enquire into the process leading to the killing, which in this type of review would be half the job.
Thus, for each of Mr. Johnson’s concerns about the wisdom or legality of a “national security court” to review targeted killing decisions, it is the reliance on ex ante review that causes all or most of the problem. However, ex-post review will give the public the assurance that it seeks that the Executive is not abusing and will not abuse its vast military might, while still providing it the room to carry out its responsibilities. Unfortunately, it is not something that many people seem to devote much attention to.
(The full text of Mr. Johnson’s address is here.)
Paul Taylor, Senior Research Fellow
Center for Policy & Research
With the confirmation hearings of John Brennan as Director of Central Intelligence, news related to the U.S. drone program is coming fast. This time it was made by Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA), chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.
Both during the hearing and in comments to the press afterward, Sen. Feinstein suggested that she and other Democrats would be working to create a new court that would review the administration’s decisions on who may be targeted in lethal counter-terrorism operations. (I assume at that such a court would be given jurisdiction over all targeted killings, not just those conducted by drones, despite the common conflation of the two.)
The concept of a court or tribunal of some sort to review or provide oversight for targeted killing decisions, whether restricted to those targeting U.S. citizens or with a broader mandate, is not new (see, e.g., our previous post). However, this is the highest profile such suggestion that has yet been made.
In Sen. Feinstein’s conception, the court would be modeled after the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), with the aim of increasing transparency and to correct public misconceptions about civilian casualties.
Such a court could also help to alleviate concerns that the administration is overly-permissive in its decisions to use targeted killing instead of other alternatives. For example, the editorial board of the New York Times writes, “Mr. Brennan’s assertions that the government only resorts to lethal force when ‘there is no other alternative’ is at odds with reports of vastly increased drone strikes.” An independent body which reviews such determinations would go a long way in ensuring that such concerns are addressed.
As an interesting aside, it seems that not everyone is concerned that President Obama is sliding into a Bush Doctrine approach. John Yoo wrote in the Wall Street Journal that “[t]he real story revealed by the [white paper released Monday] is that the Obama administration is trying to dilute the normal practice of war with law-enforcement methods.” However, this appears to be a minority view.
Ex Ante or Ex Post?
If the FISC forms the model for this targeted killing court, then the assumption would be that it would that the court would review the targeting decisions ex ante. That is, before the administration could act, it would have to produce for the court the evidence or intelligence gathered to support the targeting decision. The court would then review the evidence for some level of sufficiency before allowing the operation to move forward.
However, many of the suggestions for a tribunal to review these killings call instead for ex post review. This is the model required in Israel. The basic idea of this is generally that waiting until the operation is complete keeps the court out of the way of military or para-military operations, but still maintains some oversight.
Robert Chesney of Lawfare provided some very interesting points to consider about such a court, including whether the review should be ex ante or ex post. He falls on the side of ex ante, but some of his commentary actually seems to point in the other direction. First, he points out the all of the serious propositions would subject the nomination process to judicial review, not the “trigger pull.” This temporally removes the judicial authorization from the final decision to kill, and in Chesney’s view eliminates the concern that the process will interfere with the execution of the operation.
I’m not sure that it does. Names may be placed on the list at any time, conceivably as the result of a time sensitive push within the intelligence community. While I am not an expert in the process of targeting decisions, I think that the executive may need to be able to act quickly on new information that indicates that a subject is targetable. Ex ante review would place an additional hurdle between the decisive intelligence and the operation. Chesney seems to realize this by admitting the need for an “exigent circumstances exemption.” But this exception would itself mean defaulting back to an ex post review.
Additionally, Chesney notes that “Some judges want absolutely nothing to do with this … due to hostility to the idea of judicial involvement in death warrants. (And that’s without considering the possibility of warrant-issuing judges finding themselves the object of suit or prosecution abroad.)”
Judges would likely be much more comfortable with ex post review. Ex post review would free them from any implication that they are issuing a “death warrant” and would place them in a position that they are much more comfortable with: reviewing executive uses of force after the fact. While there are clearly parallels that could be drawn between the ex ante review proposed here and the search and seizure warrants that judges routinely deal with, there are also important differences. First and foremost is that this implicates not the executive’s law enforcement responsibility but its war-making and foreign relations responsibilities, with which courts are loath to interfere, but are sometimes willing to review for abuse.
Additionally, in search and seizure warranting, there an ex post review will eventually be available. That will likely not be the case in drone strikes and other targeted killings unless such a process is specifically created. There are simply too many hurdles to judicial review (including state secrets, political questions, discovery problems, etc) for the courts to create such an opportunity without congressional action.
Chesney also noted that executive officials involved in the nomination process would prefer an ex ante review to shield them from unexpected civil liability by the victims or their families. I’m sure that it is true that administration officials would like to have “certainty ex ante that they would not face a lawsuit.” However, this is not a guarantee that the courts can provide to the executive. As noted above, as with search and seizure warrants, there are issues to consider after the approval of the executive action. Ex ante review does not allow for inquiry into important ancillary issues, such as the balancing of risk to civilian bystanders. Also, it provides no assurances that new, exculpatory intelligence forces a reassessment of the targeting decision. Only ex post review would achieve this.
There is also the problem that typified the FISC: permissiveness. Of the tens of thousands of FISA warrant requests, only a handful have been rejected. When allowing for modification of the requests, it is not clear whether any have been finally rejected. There is little reason to believe that the proposed “drone court” will be much different. It is far too likely that a court will hesitate to impede an operation that the executive believes is required to protect out national security. Once the operation is complete, however, the court will not be inclined to hold back its criticism on all manner of aspects of the operation, from the initial targeting decision to the final execution.
Lastly, as Chesney himself points out:
Of course, there is also the question whether creating any such system is constitutional in the first place, especially if the system is framed to encompass more than just US persons…
This may true for ex ante review, but one of the courts’ fundamental mandates reviewing the executive’s activities for abuse of its power. This is even true in cases involving military or foreign affairs, where the executive is given the widest latitude and enjoys the greatest autonomy.
I do share Chesney’s suspicion that a tort-based process in which victims seek damages is not the appropriate means of reviewing targeted killing decisions. However, I am certain that regardless of whether an ex ante review is used, some ex post review must be available. There are simply too many variables between the initial nomination and the final execution of the mission that should be subject to some independent review. Indeed, as a veteran, I know the value of lessons learned in after action reviews, but I also know how often these reviews are shortchanged or skipped altogether. An ex post judicial review will ensure that this does not happen here.
Paul Taylor, Senior Research Fellow
Center for Policy & Research