Abu Ghaith Trial Postponed Due to the Sequester

It seems as though the already controversial Federal trial of Usama Bin Laden’s son-in-law, Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, may be in jeopardy- at least temporarily.

Abu Ghaith’s trial began on March 8 when he pled not guilty to conspiracy charges based on intelligence pointing to possible connections with Al-Qaida and the 9/11 attacks.  Prior to Monday, Abu Ghaith’s trial was scheduled to begin as early as September.  However, the recent sequester that has slashed federal government spending will now push proceedings back as far as 2014.

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Abu Ghaith’s public defenders argued that blanket budget cuts of 5.1 per cent would not allow them to adequately defend their client, especially given the gravity of the charges against him.  In addition, the budget cuts will force the defense team to take at least a five-week unpaid furlough this fall.  The prosecutors also requested a postponement, agreeing with the defense that the sequester will place a heavy burden on both sides during trial preparation.  Judge Lewis Kaplain called the delay “troublesome,” noting that it was difficult to contemplate that such a high-profile case would be delayed due to budget difficulties.  Still, he agreed and set the trial date for January 7, 2014.

In addition to pushing the trial back, the defense also moved to strike a 22-page statement made by Abu Ghaith shortly after he was turned over to U.S. forces in Jordan.  They also said they will seek a venue change, partly due to the close proximity to the Manhattan federal courthouse to the former site of the World Trade Center, which they believe may have an effect on the jury’s verdict.

Chris Whitten, Research Fellow
Center for Policy and Research

Seeking Sanity in the Drone Debate

Drone bashing seems to be in vogue these days, especially in on the liberal end of the media spectrum. Many of these critiques are based on faulty information or focus entirely on the most extreme examples or hypothetical situations, such as whether the government could target a US citizen sitting at a Starbucks in NYC. Of course, these arguments are feed by our own elected officials, sometimes of the conservative bent (I’m pointing at you, Rand Paul).

I would like to point out one beacon of sanity among these shrill arguments. Hassan Abbas, in his article at the Atlantic, criticizes US drone policy in Pakistan, does a remarkable job of producing a relatively balanced argument, while still clearly landing on the liberal end of the spectrum. I don’t agree with all of his assessments, or even all of his “ground realities.” For example, it is particularly questionable that we know that around 50-60% of all drone victims have been civilians. Verifying just the numbers is a difficult task, and classifying the victims into combatants and civilians even harder–and his reliance on “local estimates” falls prey to his own critique of the bias in other studies.

However, I actually do agree with his basic assessment of the situation. The use of drones allows policy-makers to feel like they are doing something about the situation, while they are in fact ignoring the underlying issues. For example, as Abbas notes,

“There were roughly 350 drone strikes in the tribal areas since 2004, at an exorbitant cost (even though drone strikes offer a cheaper option in comparison to “boots on ground”). But how many schools were opened in the region over the same period of time? The answer is distressing, as the number of schools has actually declined sharply.”

This is a relatively common argument among the few drone critics who go beyond the temptation to focus on gore or appeals to sovereignty, and take a more nuanced view. But Abbas goes one step further, pointing out the role of those the US drone campaign targets:

“Damages to more than 460 schools throughout the tribal belt at the hands of Taliban has in fact displaced 62,000 children, including 23,000 girls, from school. It doesn’t require very high intelligence to guess that in the absence of schools, and with an increase in violence, what kind of future awaits these kids. Drone strikes may take out some of those who destroyed these schools, but that is hardly a sustainable solution to the larger problem.”

And in this, he is absolutely right. The situation in which the youth were placed in the 1980s and 90s was one of the factors leading to the rise of the Taliban. And as Abbas points out, drones can do little to protect the youth, and nothing to build them new school or provide quality teachers. The drone campaign doesn’t even try to do these things.

After all, our drone policy is basically a band-aid solution. It is designed to keep the leadership of al-Qaeda and the Taliban on the run, but has no hope of finally defeating either organization. However, it is folly to think that just because drones will not solve the security or humanitarian issues in Pakistan and Afghanistan, we should abandon the policy. That said, Abbas is perfectly correct that the solution is not sustainable. It must be augmented (and eventually entirely replaced) by policy directed at the human dimension.

One problem there, though: No one knows how to do that. Any ideas?

Paul Taylor, Senior Research Fellow
Center for Policy & Research