Late on Tuesday, July 2, a massive drone strike in northwestern Pakistan killed 16 militants reported by local officials to be associated with the Haqqani network. This was the first drone strike in Pakistan since June 7th, and only the second since the election of Pakistan’s new Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif.
The Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the attack:
“These strikes are a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Pakistan has repeatedly emphasized the importance of bringing an immediate end to drone strikes.”
Pakistan’s civilian government has long protested these strikes as a violation of their sovereignty, even while their military coordinates with the US to a clear airspace for the drones. Few in Pakistan vocally support the drone strikes, despite the fact that some officials will quietly admit that they have been an effective means of dealing with their chronic militant problem. Despite this quiet acknowledgement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement asserted that:
“The government of Pakistan has consistently maintained that drone strikes are counterproductive, entail loss of innocent civilian lives and have human rights and humanitarian implications. These drone strikes have a negative impact on the mutual desire of both countries to forge a cordial and cooperative relationship and to ensure peace and stability in the region.”
The last part is definitely true, and will be increasingly true in the future. In fact, at least one analyst believes that the strike will be taken as a personal affront to newly-elected Prime Minister Sharif, since it was conducted while he was out of country on a state visit to China, and may in fact be one of the last drone strikes in Pakistan.
This is not entirely far-fetched, given the rather remarkable decline in drone strikes in Pakistan over the course of the past few years, as I have written about previously, despite initial fears on the left that Obama was going to drastically increase the use of drone strikes. Although, according to data from the New America Foundation, he did initially increase the use of drones to attack militants in Pakistan, quadrupling the number of strikes over his first two years (and incidentally, halving the number of civilian casualties over the same period).
However, there is reason to disbelieve that this declining rate of strikes signals the end of the program. Probably the best indicator is that the drop in the number of drone strikes does not appear to be correlated to any decrease in the number of leaders these strikes have taken out of the fight. This may just indicate that the strikes are more selective, and that we are getting better at locating and targeting the leadership.
Interestingly, it is not necessarily our own enemies that we have been targeting. It is relatively well-known that the first drone strike in Pakistan, which killed Taliban leader Nek Mohammad, was selected at the specific request of the Pakistani military, in order to rid them of an enemy of the Pakistani state. And while the Afghan Taliban have received aid and shelter from Pakistan, their sister organization, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has targeted Pakistani government forces and installations with brutal efficiency. They have even captured territory startling close to Pakistan’s capitol, Islamabad. Pakistan seems unable or unwilling to crush this movement. The US has been working on it for them, however. Of the five Taliban leaders killed in US drone strikes in 2013, four have been leaders of TTP. Simultaneously, the number of Afghan Taliban leaders killed in drone strikes has been on the decline.
With all of the back-room dealing that has occurred between various parts of the Pakistani and US governments, is entirely possible that a deal has been struck with the Pakistani military that will allow the US to continue to use drones to target its own enemy, so long as it also takes out Pakistan’s, as well.
There is also reason to believe that the US will continue to use drones in Pakistan with or without its consent. The continuing instability in rural Pakistan and the inability of the Pakistani government to reduce the violence emanating from the region, which is much more substantial than that caused by drones, as well as its inability or unwillingness to limit the export of terrorism and insurgency from its territory cannot simply be ignored. It is not a bumblebee that will go away if left to its own devices. And until some alternate method of limiting the Taliban’s and Al Qaeda’s ability to use Pakistan’s territory to train and equip their operatives and send them out against America and its allies, the US government will have little choice but to employ drones, even if in a more limited and selective fashion.
Paul W. Taylor, Senior Fellow
Center for Policy & Research