Earlier today, the Iraqi government announced that it has shut down the Abu Ghraib prison. According to Iraqi officials, the closure is due to growing concerns that Sunni insurgents in the area may have the capabilities to launch an attack against the prison, possibly freeing some of the roughly 2,400 prisoners. Those prisoners have now been moved to more secure locations in central and northern Iraq. It is unclear at this point whether Abu Ghraib will reopen if the Iraqi government is able to secure the area. Continue reading
Yesterday afternoon, the Associated Press reported that the US is currently tracking an American citizen and terrorist suspect in Pakistan. While officials have not confirmed the identity of the man, they described him as an “al Qaeda facilitator” who is currently plotting attacks against the United States. Now the Obama administration is struggling with the question of whether to use the controversial drone program to eliminate him. Continue reading
In response to the continuing hunger strike, which has placed all but 15 detainees in single-cell confinement, the U.S. military has requested additional guards to be sent to Guantanamo. There are currently 1,831 troops and civilians assigned to the prison’s 166 captives. However, as Navy Capt. Robert Duran, the prison spokesman, stated, “When you go to a single cell, that takes more people.”
Since the hunger strike began, the captives, who once lived communally, are now confined to individual cells. This requires more work for the guards who deliver food through slots, and must now shackle each man in order to leave their cell for most activities, where they are again confined alone. This Saturday, 124 reinforcements from the Texas-based 591st Military Police Co. will arrive. As of Wednesday, 125 soldiers from the 613th MP Co., based out of Puerto Rico, have been deployed for 30 days of training in Fort Bliss, Texas. From there they will be sent to enter the regular rotation at Guantanamo Bay.
While the increased personnel would “come in handy” as the camps are in single-cell operations, Southcom spokesmanNavy Lt. Cmdr. Ron Flanders has stated that the additional units are being sent to GTMO partially in anticipation of the military commissions, and that Doral headquarters, which oversees the prison camps, might be “ramping up,” by setting a goal of reaching 2,000 personnel. Regardless of the reasoning, Guantanamo will have a large staffing increase in the impending weeks.
Alexandra Kutner, Research Fellow
Center for Policy and Research
After a recent secret visit to Pakistan, Ben Emmerson, the U.N. special rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism (see my previous posts here and here), released a statement that the Pakistani government “emphasized its consistently-stated position that drone strikes on its territory are counter-productive, contrary to international law, a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and that they should cease immediately.”
The US has previously relied on the contention that Pakistan consented to these strikes, and it has a lot of support to back it up. In fact, diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks confirm that Pakistani leaders did not oppose the use of drones on their soil, and even encouraged it. It is true that Pakistani officials have made public statements that the attacks are not welcome and should stop. But as pointed out by Ben Farley in his thoughtful piece on the D.C. Exile blog, it is not always clear from public sources when consent has been given or revoked, as when then-Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh consented to US drone strikes on its territory, but under the pretense that they were the actions of his own air force. No one who witnessed such a strike would therefore know that it was not a breach of Yemeni sovereignty.
Emmerson, however, has apparently adopted a black and white view of the issue after his meetings with Pakistani officials, claiming that “[t]he position of the Government of Pakistan is quite clear. It does not consent to the use of drones by the United States on its territory.” But it is not clear.
Ben Farley’s conclusion is a more thorough and eloquent presentation of my own thoughts on the issue than I could hope to achieve:
Pakistan’s behavior in general has been at best ambiguous. Despite having the capacity to “‘trace and detect any aircraft’” operating near its border with Pakistan and (apparently) the ability to shoot such aircraft down, there have never been reports of Pakistan shooting down a U.S. drone. Although the absence of public reports of such downings is not dispositive, the fact that U.S. drones carry out any strikes even though they are slow moving, are not maneuverable, and carry no air defense countermeasures, strongly suggests that Pakistan ischoosing not to interdict drones. Additionally, Pakistan has a modern air force that is at least as capable as the Iranian air force but, while Iran has chased a number of U.S. air force drones over the Persian Gulf in recent months, there have never been any similar reports from Pakistan. Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, Pakistan has not taken the sort of concrete steps vis-à-vis the United States for drone strikes as it has for other violations of Pakistani sovereignty. For example, in November 2011, a frontier incident between U.S. and Pakistani troops (that resulted in the death of 26 Pakistanis), led Pakistan to both close its border with Afghanistan to NATO convoys and to kick U.S. drones out from their Pakistani bases. Pakistan also upgraded its Afghan-border air defense systems. Similarly, after a CIA contractor killed two Pakistanis in January 2011, Pakistan ousted all CIA contractors and reduced the number of U.S. special operators allowed in Pakistan for training missions from 120 to 39. Not only has Pakistan not taken such steps in response to U.S. drone strikes, at least until the Wall Street Journal report at the end of September 2012, Pakistan continued to clear the parts of its air space in which the CIA indicated it would conduct drone strikes. That is to say, not only is Pakistan not intervening to prevent drone strikes, it is taking affirmative steps to facilitate those strikes. Thus, Pakistan’s behavior at least renders its public statement ambiguous and, more likely, supersedes those statements altogether. Again, consent must be clearly stated but clearly stated to the recipient of that consent not the outside world.
If the United States is operating without Pakistan’s consent within Pakistan, it is violating Pakistan’s sovereignty—and it may be violating international law. However, Emmerson’s conclusion notwithstanding, it is far from clear that, as a matter of international law, the United States is violating Pakistani sovereignty.
Paul Taylor, Senior Research Fellow
Center for Policy & Research
Sometime in the last twelve years, someone moved the goalposts. We’ve gone from wanting to crush the Taliban like the backwater illiterates they are, to wanting to abide their trouble while we slowly secure the country.
And according to then-outgoing commander of our troops in Afghanistan, General John Allen, “This is winning, this is what victory looks like.”
What he did not add was that winning would look like this for years to come. 2014 has come to be seen as what one Afghan official has called a “magical date”, a make-or-break date by which the conflict will effectively be determined one way or the other. But the truth is that there is little reason to believe that it will all be sorted out by then.
This is a sad result for the most powerful military the world has ever seen, but realizing the limits of our ability to drive the outcome is an appropriate and helpful adjustment to the factual situation.
The time in which a decisive battlefield victory over Taliban was possible ended sometime in late 2001 or very early 2002, and was given up when we decided not to press Pakistan to seal off its border (or allow us to do so). Since then, the US and the Afghan government it helped into being have been engaged in a cross-border insurgency, and it is by the fundamental laws of insurgency that the conflict will be won or lost.
We need to abandon the naïve idea that we can crush the Taliban on the field of battle, and realize the truth that has been recognized by the Taliban since the beginning: winning will be determined by which side can be relied upon to provide basic governmental services like security and justice.
And while some may have read my earlier post as entirely pessimistic, there is reason to hope that Afghanistan is at least generally headed in the right direction. First, Afghans themselves are making the investment, in very real terms. According to General John Allen:
“[E]very Sunday when we’ve read the names of our Coalition dead, the Afghan National Army steps up to recognize the sons of Afghanistan, also who have sacrificed in this conflict. And every week there are 25 or 35 or 45 killed in action and 50 or 60 or 70 wounded. There can be no doubt that Afghanistan is investing in its own future. The cost is paid in the blood of their finest young warriors.”
A report by CSIS indicates the total ANSF deaths are now well over 4,000, and it seems likely they are growing faster than those of ISAF.
In addition, the Afghan Army have been largely successful in keeping civilian casualties to a minimum, despite the increased combat pressure they are bearing and the fact that are not yet as professional as their mentors. According to the CSIS report:
“Between 1 January and 30 June, UNAMA documented 20 civilian deaths and 12 injured from search and seizure operations by Pro-Government Forces, a decrease of 27 percent compared with the same period in 2011. This is consistent with the downward trends documented in the same periods in 2009, 2010 and 2011. Civilian casualties as a result of ANSF and ISAF escalation of force incidents continued to decrease in 2012.”
The Afghan Government is also working to reduce its reputation for brutal interrogation and detention. For example, in response to recent reports detailing the prevalence of torture in Afghan detention centers, President Karzai has ordered that all interrogations be video recorded to ensure that the detainees are properly treated.
Such hard-fought successes can be short-lived, as can be seen in Karzai’s ban on ANSF calls for close air support in residential areas in response to an incident that caused severe collateral damage. However, this may be a good development in the long run. Remember that the Taliban cannot be defeated on the field of battle: the flip-side of that coin is that the Government can lose the population’s support by a too-aggressive approach. The French learned this same lesson in Algeria, where their brutal tactics won them a very shallow and self-defeating victory over their insurgent foes. Reducing civilian casualties is an important component of providing civilians a sense of security.
The other major good that the government must provide to the people in order to bolster its legitimacy and weaken the Taliban’s appeal is in the area of governance, justice and civil conflict resolution. Here, the vast majority of the damage done to its reputation has been entirely self-inflicted: endemic corruption in the courts and police has caused many in the south to turn to the Taliban to help them resolve their disputes with one another. While the Taliban verdicts are swift and harsh, they are also perceived as untainted by biased and corruption.
Unfortunately, there is little indication that the highest levels of the US or Afghanistan governments are very interested in tackling the corruption issue. Few official statements by either government ever mention the issue as more than a passing reference. Furthermore, little progress has been made in the past decade. Indeed, a recent report by the UN Office of Drugs and Crime found that while the number of Afghans who have to pay bribes has been dropping since 2009 (from 59% of Afghans to a mere 50%), the total cost of the corruption has risen 40%. And those who find themselves in the position where they must pay a bribe are subjected to higher bribes more often.
While there is good news in that there has been a 10% drop in the incidence of police bribery, this is counterbalanced by the fact that there has been no improvement in the judicial branch. Indeed, while the reporting rate of bribery appears to high by international standards, only one fifth of these reports lead to any investigation.
Since it’s speedy and reliable night courts are the one of the Taliban’s greatest selling points, it is imperative to Afghanistan’s long term stability that the epidemic of corruption be brought to heel. While it would be pie in the sky to think that success ending corruption could be quickly and easily be achieved by any means, the Afghan government and the US as its partner must secure steady and visible progress in reducing the corruption that impacts the day-to-day lives of Afghan citizens. This is perhaps especially important in the sectors that are mandated to combat corruption, such as the police and courts.
Thankfully, the lower levels of the US government have begun to take some steps in this direction. In the last few years, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has quietly begun to tackle the US military’s enormous contribution to the climate of corruption (as well as some of its absurdly wasteful practices), while USAID’s Assistance for Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Authority program has helped Afghanistan develop its High Office of Oversight and supported civil watch-dog groups. Clearly, much more must be done, but it is precisely these sorts of quiet efforts that will prove most effective in the long run.
Even if the Afghan government is able to reduce the corruption that encourages support for the Taliban, the insurgency will continue to drag on for years so long as they have a sanctuary in which to rest, recover, and prepare for the next operation. This is even more true if they may continue to rely on a state sponsor for support. Because of this, Pakistan plays a pivotal role in determining the longevity of the Taliban movement.
Thankfully, here too there is some reason for hope. With its increased internal instability, Pakistan has recently changed its strategic goal, limiting their references to “strategic depth” (read proxy government in Afghanistan) and calling instead for “power sharing” between the Afghan government and the Taliban. With its interest in stability along its border, the more Pakistan can be convinced that the Afghan state will not crumble in the wake of the US withdrawal, the less support it will provide to the opposition.
As with governance and security, progress in this regard will likely come in small and barely-noticeable form. It will not come as an announcement of a new policy or realignment on the part of Pakistan, but as changes in the attitudes of Pakistani leadership, declines in public support for the Taliban or in opposition to the US, or incremental reduction of support from the military.
This is What Victory Looks Like
Afghanistan has not been a stunning success by any metric. It was badly bungled, then pushed onto the back burner for years. By the time Americans noticed that it was still going on, the Taliban had regained much of their previous strength and had plenty of opportunity to hone their skills.
Yet it may yet be true that, from our current vantage point, this is what success looks like. Securing Afghanistan will require the long and tiring process of building state legitimacy while wearing down, coopting, and waiting out the insurgency.
“[O]ur victory here may never be marked by a parade or a point in time on a calendar when victory is declared. This insurgency will be defeated over time by the legitimate and well-trained Afghan forces that are emerging today, who are taking the field in full force this spring. Afghan forces defending Afghan people and enabling the government of this country to serve its citizens. This is victory. This is what winning looks like, and we should not shrink from using these words.”
Paul Taylor, Senior Research Fellow
Center for Policy & Research
Recently, most public debate about the course of the war in
Afghanistan has centered on the pace of the U.S. troop withdrawal.
Distinctly lacking from the discourse is discussion of what happens
afterwards. In those few cases in which this is considered, it is
always couched in terms of how much or what kind of support we can
give to President Karzai or his successor.
Such medium-term considerations are of course very important. However,
in order to properly determine our best medium-term course of action,
we must have a clear an understanding of the longer-term range of
outcomes. For instance, support to Karzai or any other successor
assumes that the government will survive the U.S. withdrawal.
Unfortunately, there are many reasons to question whether the
government will in fact survive.
First, there are the centrifugal forces that constantly pull at the
pieces of the Afghan National Security Forces, the centerpiece of the
U.S. withdrawal strategy. The U.S. plans to “stand down as they stand
up,” but this will only work if they also stand together. It is
important to remember who the ANSF are, and how they are organized.
The majority of these forces are commanded by former mujahideen from
the 1990’s. These are the same men who, after the defeat of the
soviets, created a new government, only to tear it and the rest of the
country to pieces shortly thereafter. This should matter greatly to
our strategic planning: what are we doing to ensure that their
factionalism does not again rip the new state apart? This is
especially concerning since the U.S. has encouraged the creation of
local militias in addition to the ANSF.
Second, there is the Taliban to contend with. Last time a major power
withdrew from Afghanistan, it did so under pressure from the
Mujahideen, not the Taliban. And as noted, the Mujahideen were a
fractious conglomeration of various different groups, unused to
heeding central authority. The Taliban, by contrast, are a political
movement as much as an Army. They therefore have a political ideology
binding them together and giving them common purpose. After all, the
Taliban was formed in reaction to the rampant factionalism of the
1990’s. They thus have a great advantage in surviving challenges and
repelling attempts to buy off pieces of their armed forces (a common
tactic in Afghanistan).
Third, the Taliban have a distinct legitimacy advantage. Not only are
they are a Pashtun group seeking to rule a Pashtun-majority country,
they also provide real governance at the ground level (even in areas
they do not currently hold). The Taliban, interested more than
anything in law and order of the strictest nature, brooks no
corruption within its ranks. The Afghan people know this, and respect
it. The national government, by contrast, is mainly seen as a pool of
corrupt leeches, for very good reason. The U.S. has done little or
nothing to confront the rampant corruption of the government, police,
Lastly, and of no little import, the Taliban have a geographic
advantage. They can enter almost any area of Afghanistan, as they have
shown through several high-profile attacks on Kabul. Meanwhile, the
Afghan government cannot follow them back to their redoubt in the
tribal areas of Pakistan. Until Pakistan reverses its policy of active
support for the Taliban and other insurgent groups, the Taliban will
have a large and secure area to rest, rearm, and plan. It has been
shown that insurgencies with such cross-border safe havens are much
more likely to survive and thus succeed in toppling the government.
Indeed, this is how the Taliban got started.
Given these factors, it seems highly likely that the Taliban will
succeed in driving the Karzai government from power within a
relatively short time. Some very respectable analysts estimate that
the government would not be able to keep Kabul more than two years
after the U.S. withdrawal is effective. Whether or not this is the
case, the plausibility of the scenario warrants study and discussion.
The U.S. needs to be prepared to deal with whoever is in charge of
Afghanistan. As yet, there has been no discussion of how the U.S.
should prepare for, or handle, a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Can
anything consequential be done prior to complete withdrawal? If the
Taliban take power, should the U.S. accommodate them, and interface
with the new regime, as it has done with other popularly supported
insurgencies? Should we plan for a partitioned Afghanistan?
With the troop withdrawal around the corner, we need to start planning
for every eventuality. And if we expect that the Taliban will return,
we must start laying the groundwork now for whatever form our
relations with them will take.
Paul Taylor, Senior Research Fellow
Center for Policy & Research